On the assumption (which I will not question) that promises made under certain circumstances (which I will not try to specify) in general forge a moral bond between promisor and promisee, and that my particular promise to you is made under these circumstances, the answer may seem obvious: my obligation is to keep my promise, and I will fulfill this obligation if and only if I return the book to you by Friday. (Throughout this paper, I will be exclusively concerned with moral obligation, whether I mention this explicitly or not.) This answer − the First Answer − is the one that W.D.
Ross gave in The Right and the Good.
1 Nine years later, in Foundations of
1.
In The Right and the Good Ross mentions each of the three answers just noted (or something close to them) (RG, . To each answer he entertains the objection that it implies that one is obligated to act from a certain motive, which he claims (on the basis of an argument given earlier [RG, ) can never be the case. He asserts that the Second Answer falls to this objection, that the Third Answer probably does so, but that the First Answer is best interpreted so that it lacks the implication. Ross also claims that the Second and Third Answers fall to the objection that one fulfills one's promise and does one's duty only by doing that which one has promised to do, whereas the First Answer clearly escapes this objection.
The first objection is a red herring. Regardless of the merits of the claim that one cannot be obligated to act from a certain motive, there is no need to interpret any of the Answers as implying the contrary. (As far as the Second Answer goes, Ross himself recognizes this point in his later work [FE, p. 158] , when he notes that one can set oneself to produce a certain result from any one of a variety of motives.) The second objection also misfires, in one of two ways. If by "duty" Ross means that which it is one's obligation to do, then the objection begs the question: the First Answer is simply being presupposed and the other Answers are being ruled out by fiat. If by "duty" Ross means something else, then the Second and Third
Answers are not being ruled out, but then the First Answer enjoys no advantage over them. The upshot is that Ross doesn't so much argue for the First Answer as simply assert it.
In The Right and the Good Ross implicitly embraces the Objective View, and the First Answer is derived from this view. In order to state the view clearly, let me use terminology that Ross uses more frequently in
Foundations of Ethics (when he contrasts the Objective View with the Subjective View). We can say that some acts are "objectively morally suitable" to the situation in which an agent finds him-or herself (FE, pp.
146 ff.). (Henceforth, I will simply use the term "suit" and its cognates to express this idea.) Such suitability comes in degrees. For example, suppose that you have gratuitously insulted Bert. Perhaps it would be most suitable (insofar as your having insulted him is concerned) for you to apologize to him in person. Or perhaps it would be equally suitable for you to send him flowers with a card expressing your remorse. It might be less suitable, but suitable nonetheless, if you left him a brief apology on his answering machine. However, you would be overdoing it if you bought him a new TV, and it might be positively unsuitable if you bought him a new car. It would also be unsuitable (for reasons of gross deficiency rather than gross excess) if you wrote Bert a letter in which you repeated your insults. We thus get a sort of hierarchy of suitability and unsuitability. Note that an act may be (un)suitable with respect to one aspect of one's situation but not with respect to another. The illustration just given has to do with reparation for a previous wrongful act. The illustration with which this paper began and is chiefly concerned has to do with fidelity to a previous commitment.
Ross believes that each kind of response (reparation, fidelity) is suitable to that particular aspect of one's situation (previous wrongdoing, previous commitment) that has been specified (RG, pp. 21 ff.). If one is so situated that one cannot both make reparation and keep a promise, then doing the former will suit one aspect of one's situation but not another, whereas doing the latter will suit the other aspect but not the one. Which act is more suitable to one's situation as a whole, taking all aspects of the situation into account, will vary from case to case. Sometimes making reparation will take precedence, sometimes keeping a promise will.
The Objective View may now be put as follows.
Objective View:
For any act, A:
(1) A is prima facie morally right if and only if there is some aspect, S, of the agent's situation such that no alternative to A more suits S;
(2) A is prima facie morally wrong if and only if there is some aspect, S, of the agent's situation such that some alternative to A more suits S;
(3) A is prima facie morally obligatory if and only if there is some aspect, S, of the agent's situation such that A suits S more than any alternative;
(4) A is overall morally right if and only if no alternative to A more suits the agent's situation as a whole;
(5) A is overall morally wrong if and only if some alternative to A more suits the agent's situation as a whole;
(6) A is overall morally obligatory if and only if A suits the agent's situation as a whole more than any alternative. 4 4 Note the following points (which I will not pursue) concerning this formulation of the Objective View. (i) It presupposes that A is among the agent's alternatives in the situation (and relies on some criterion for identifying alternatives and situations). An alternative is an action that the agent can perform. The Objective View (like the Subjective and Prospective Views to follow) thus presupposes that "ought" or "obligatory" (together with "right" and "wrong") implies "can." This is a principle that Ross explicitly endorses (RG, p. 5), although he doesn't elaborate on the sense of "can" at issue. I won't elaborate on it either, except to say that I understand it to be the sense that is at issue in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. (It may be that there is not just one sense but a set of related senses at issue in this debate. There is no room to explore this point further here.)
(ii) The term "more suits" or "suits more" is to be understood liberally. (1965) .) (iv) My formulation of the Objective View draws a sharp distinction between "ought" (or "obligatory") and "right." Ross recognizes this distinction (RG, pp. 3-4) but then deliberately blurs it for stylistic reasons. I find little merit in these reasons and will not follow his lead in this regard. (v) My use of the term "prima facie" accords with Ross's (RG, ; "pro tanto" would probably be better. "Overall" is not Ross's term; instead he uses "proper," "actual," "absolute,"
and "sans phrase" (RG, 28 
2.
In The Right and the Good Ross says: "To me it seems as self-evident as anything could be, that to make a promise…is to create a moral claim on us in someone else" (RG, p. 21 n. The objective element consists of the facts about various persons and things involved in the situation, in virtue of which a certain act would in fact be the best possible fulfilment of the various prima facie obligations resting on the agent.
He then goes on to say (FE, p. 146):
The subjective element consists of the agent's thoughts about the situation.
These are as much parts of the total situation as are the objective facts. And the act which is morally suitable to them, i.e. the act which the agent, in view of his opinion about the situation, thinks will be the maximum fulfilment of obligation, will be in that respect right. Thus: an act is objectively prima facie right just in case it is in fact (most) suitable to some aspect of one's situation; an act is subjectively prima facie right just in case one thinks that it is (most) suitable to some aspect of one's situation.
A third difficulty has to do with the thoughts in virtue of which an act may be said to be subjectively right. Ross himself goes on to distinguish two accounts of subjective rightness: (i) an act is subjectively right just in case it would in fact (most) suit one's situation, if one's situation were as one thinks it to be; (ii) an act is subjectively right just in case one thinks that it (most) suits one's situation (FE, p. 161). The first account restricts the relevant thoughts to those that concern one's situation (where one's situation is construed nonnormatively); they do not also concern, as the second account does, what suits one's situation (a normative matter). 8 It is the second account that Ross embraces.
A final difficulty has to do with the fact that we now have three senses of "right" (and related terms, such as "wrong," "obligatory," "obligation,"
and i.e., direct, I think we must remain highly suspicious of the Second Answer.
4.
In light of the foregoing, Ross's conversion from the Objective View to the Subjective View is appropriately described as "one of the stranger episodes in the history of ethics." 24 And, as I noted at the outset, it is surely plausible to contend that, in the particular matter of the book, it is the First Answer There may be circumstances which the agent does not foresee, but which a wiser or better-informed person might foresee, which would in fact cause a certain activity of the agent's to produce a certain result, the production of which would be objectively right. Yet it would not be reasonable for the agent, if he wished to do his duty, to perform such an activity, since ex hypothesi he neither knows nor thinks the activity would have this result. The fact that other people might know or think this has no tendency to make it reasonable for him to act thus. What he ought to set himself to do, then, is neither that which will in fact produce the result in question, nor that which in the judgement of betterinformed people is likely to produce it, but that which he thinks likely to produce it. This is confused. Return to the case just presented. The reason why you ought to take route A is not because you think it reasonable to act in this way, but because it is reasonable to act in this way; and it is not reasonable for you to act in this way because you think the probabilities favor your doing so, but because the probabilities do favor your doing so. The The Prospective View may now be put more fully and accurately as follows:
Prospective View:
( cannot (given my epistemic situation) thereby intentionally keep my promise. 33 We should say that, when it comes to direct obligation (concerning which see Sections I and III above), only that which one can intentionally do is obligatory. The Prospective View should be qualified to reflect this. 34 Given such qualification, this view once again implies that I ought to use service A.
5.
Let me now turn to the implications of the Prospective View regarding your having a right to receive the book by Friday. 38 Etymologically, the term "obligation" invokes the idea of an association (a link, a tie, a bond, a ligation) between obligor and obligee, but its sense has broadened so that it expresses a contrary of wrongdoing generally. Not all wrongdoing need involve wronging someone, in the sense of infringing someone's rights. 39 A particularly dramatic sort of case in which obligations and rights can part company is one in which the person whom the obligation involves does not exist.
Suppose that, after lending me the book on Monday, you die before I have the opportunity to return it to you, but that I have every reason to believe that you are still alive. Then I will still be obligated to do that which provides me the best prospect of returning the book to you by Friday, even though you, being dead, no longer have a right against me that I do so. (In so saying, I am of course rejecting the claim that you have a posthumous right to this effect.) Once again, this is perfectly in keeping with the Correlativity Thesis, since the obligation in question is not an associative one; that it, it is not one that I owe to you.
[T]hat our conclusion is not as strange as at first sight it might seem is shown by the fact that if the carelessly dispatched book comes to hand, it is not my duty to send another copy, while if the carefully dispatched book does not come to hand I must send another copy to replace it. In the first case I have not my duty still to do, which shows that I have done it; in the second I have it still to do, which shows that I have not done it.
Ross's position is captured in the following chart, where: "Carefully dispatched" concerns whether I initially did that which provided me the best prospect of returning the book to you; "Book received" concerns whether you received the book; and "Obligation to resend" concerns whether I have a subsequent obligation to send either the book itself or a replacement. The position that I endorse, in keeping with both the Prospective View and the Correlativity Thesis, is captured in the following chart, where:
"Carefully dispatched" and "Book received" are to be understood as before; "Evidence of book received" concerns my subsequent evidence regarding whether you received the book; "Obligation to resend" is now understood to concern whether I have a subsequent obligation (associative or nonassociative) to do that which provides me the best prospect of sending
